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Abstract
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that
information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by
different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider
different semantics that capture different assumptions about the agents’ be-
liefs regarding whether or not there is ambiguity. We consider the impact
of ambiguity on a seminal result in economics: Aumann’s result saying that
agents with a common prior cannot agree to disagree. This result is known
not to hold if agents do not have a common prior; we show that it also does
not hold in the presence of ambiguity. We then consider the tradeoff between
assuming a common interpretation (i.e., no ambiguity) and a common prior
(i.e., shared initial beliefs).
1 Introduction
In the study of multi-agent modal logics, it is always implicitly assumed that all
agents interpret all formulas the same way. While they may have different beliefs
∗This paper wil appear in the Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Princi-
ples of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2012).
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regarding whether a formula ϕ is true, they agree on what ϕ means. Formally, this
is captured by the fact that the truth of ϕ does not depend on the agent.
Of course, in the real world, there is ambiguity; different agents may interpret
the same utterance in different ways. For example, consider a public announcement
p. Each player i may interpret p as corresponding to some event Ei, where Ei may
be different from Ej if i 6= j. This seems natural: even if people have a common
background, they may still disagree on how to interpret certain phenomena or new
information. Someone may interpret a smile as just a sign of friendliness; someone
else may interpret it as a “false” smile, concealing contempt; yet another person
may interpret it as a sign of sexual interest.
To model this formally, we can use a straightforward approach already used
in [Halpern 2009; Grove and Halpern 1993]: formulas are interpreted relative to a
player. But once we allow such ambiguity, further subtleties arise. Returning to
the announcement p, not only can it be interpreted differently by different players,
it may not even occur to the players that others may interpret the announcement in
a different way. Thus, for example, i may believe that Ei is common knowledge.
The assumption that each player believes that her interpretation is how everyone in-
terprets the announcement is but one assumption we can make about ambiguity. It
is also possible that player i may be aware that there is more than one interpretation
of p, but believes that player j is aware of only one interpretation. For example,
think of a politician making an ambiguous statement which he realizes that differ-
ent constituencies will interpret differently, but will not realize that there are other
possible interpretations. In this paper, we investigate a number of different seman-
tics of ambiguity that correspond to some standard assumptions that people make
with regard to ambiguous statements, and investigate their relationship.
Our interest in ambiguity is motivated by a seminal result in game theory: Au-
mann’s [1976] theorem showing that players cannot “agree to disagree”. More
precisely, this theorem says that agents with a common prior on a state space can-
not have common knowledge that they have different posteriors.1 This result has
been viewed as paradoxical in the economics literature. Trade in a stock market
seems to require common knowledge of disagreement (about the value of the stock
being traded), yet we clearly observe a great deal of trading.
One well known explanation for the disagreement is that we do not in fact
have common priors: agents start out with different beliefs. We provide a different
explanation here, in terms of ambiguity. It is easy to show that we can agree to dis-
agree when there is ambiguity, even if there is a common prior. We then show that
these two explanations of the possibility of agreeing to disagree are closely related,
but not identical. We can convert an explanation in terms of ambiguity to an ex-
1We explain this result in more detail in Section 3.
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planation in terms of lack of common priors.2 Importantly, however, the converse
does not hold; there are models in which players have a common interpretation
that cannot in general be converted into an equivalent model with ambiguity and a
common prior. In other words, using heterogeneous priors may be too permissive
if we are interested in modeling a situation where differences in beliefs are due to
differences in interpretation.
Although our work is motivated by applications in economics, ambiguity has
long been a concern in linguistics and natural language processing. For example,
there has been a great deal of work on word-sense disambiguation (i.e., trying to
decide from context which of the multiple meanings of a word are intended); see
Hirst [1988] for a seminal contribution, and Navigli [2009] for a recent survey.
However, there does not seem to be much work on incorporating ambiguity into a
logic. Apart from the literature on the logic of context and on underspecification
(see Van Deemter and Peters [1996]), the only paper that we are aware of that does
this is one by Monz [1999]. Monz allows for statements that have multiple inter-
pretations, just as we do. But rather than incorporating the ambiguity directly into
the logic, he considers updates by ambiguous statements. There are also connec-
tions between ambiguity and vagueness. Although the two notions are different—a
term is vague if it is not clear what its meaning is, and is ambiguous if it can have
multiple meanings, Halpern [2009] also used agent-dependent interpretations in
his model of vagueness, although the issues that arose were quite different from
those that concern us here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the logic that
we consider. Section 3 investigates the implications of the common-prior assump-
tion when there is ambiguity. Section 4 studies the tradeoff between heterogeneous
priors and ambiguity, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Syntax and Semantics
2.1 Syntax
We want a logic where players use a fixed common language, but each player may
interpret formulas in the language differently. We also want to allow the players to
be able to reason about (probabilistic) beliefs.
The syntax of the logic is straightforward (and is, indeed, essentially the syntax
already used in papers going back to Fagin and Halpern [1994]). There is a finite,
2More precisely, we can convert a model with ambiguity and a common prior to an equivalent
model—equivalent in the sense that the same formulas are true—where there is no ambiguity but no
common prior.
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nonempty set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, and a countable, nonempty set Φ of
primitive propositions. Let LCn (Φ) be the set of formulas that can be constructed
starting from Φ, and closing off under conjunction, negation, the modal operators
{CBG}G⊆N,G 6=∅, and the formation of probability formulas. (We omit the Φ if it is
irrelevant or clear from context.) Probability formulas are constructed as follows.
If ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are formulas, and a1, . . . , ak, b ∈ Q, then for i ∈ N ,
a1pr i(ϕ1) + . . . + akpr i(ϕk) ≥ b
is a probability formula, where pr i(ϕ) denotes the probability that player i assigns
to a formula ϕ. Note that this syntax allows for nested probability formulas. We
use the abbreviation Biϕ for pr i(ϕ) = 1, EB1Gϕ for ∧i∈GBiϕ, and EB
m+1
G ϕ for
EBmGEB
1
Gϕ for m = 1, 2 . . .. Finally, we take true to be the abbreviation for a
fixed tautology such as p ∨ ¬p.
2.2 Epistemic probability structures
There are standard approaches for interpreting this language [Fagin and Halpern 1994],
but they all assume that there is no ambiguity, that is, that all players interpret the
primitive propositions the same way. To allow for different interpretations, we use
an approach used earlier [Halpern 2009; Grove and Halpern 1993]: formulas are
interpreted relative to a player.
An (epistemic probability) structure (over Φ) has the form
M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (πj)j∈N ),
where Ω is the state space, and for each i ∈ N , Πi is a partition of Ω, Pi is a
function that assigns to each ω ∈ Ω a probability space Pi(ω) = (Ωi,ω,Fi,ω, µi,ω),
and πi is an interpretation that associates with each state a truth assignment to
the primitive propositions in Φ. That is, πi(ω)(p) ∈ {true, false} for all ω and
each primitive proposition p. Intuitively, πi describes player i’s interpretation of
the primitive propositions. Standard models use only a single interpretation π;
this is equivalent in our framework to assuming that π1 = · · · = πn. We call a
structure where π1 = · · · = πn a common-interpretation structure. Denote by
[[p]]i the set of states where i assigns the value true to p. The partitions Πi are
called information partitions. While it is more standard in the philosophy and
computer science literature to use models where there is a binary relation Ki on
Ω for each agent i that describes i’s accessibility relation on states, we follow the
common approach in economics of working with information partitions here, as
that makes it particularly easy to define a player’s probabilistic beliefs. Assuming
information partitions corresponds to the case that Ki is an equivalence relation
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(and thus defines a partition). The intuition is that a cell in the partition Πi is
defined by some information that i received, such as signals or observations of the
world. Intuitively, agent i receives the same information at each state in a cell of Πi.
Let Πi(ω) denote the cell of the partition Πi containing ω. Finally, the probability
space Pi(ω) = (Ωi,ω,Fi,ω, µi,ω) describes the beliefs of player i at state ω, with
µi,ω a probability measure defined on the subspace Ωi,ω of the state space Ω. The
σ-algebra Fi,ω consists of the subsets of Ωi,ω to which µi,ω can assign a probability.
(If Ωi,ω is finite, we typically take Fi,ω = 2Ωi,ω , the set of all subsets of Ωi,ω.) The
interpretation is that µi,ω(E) is the probability that i assigns to event E ∈ Fi,ω in
state ω.
Throughout this paper, we make the following assumptions regarding the prob-
ability assignments Pi, i ∈ N :
A1. For all ω ∈ Ω, Ωi,ω = Πi(ω).
A2. For all ω ∈ Ω, if ω′ ∈ Πi(ω), then Pi(ω′) = Pi(ω).
A3. For all j ∈ N,ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, Πi(ω) ∩Πj(ω′) ∈ Fi,ω.
Furthermore, we make the following joint assumption on players’ interpretations
and information partitions:
A4. For all ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N , and primitive proposition p ∈ Φ, Πi(ω)∩ [[p]]i ∈ Fi,ω.
These are all standard assumptions. A1 says that the set of states to which player i
assigns probability at state ω is just the set Πi(ω) of worlds that i considers possible
at state ω. A2 says that the probability space used is the same at all the worlds in a
cell of player i’s partition. Intuitively, this says that player i knows his probability
space. Informally, A3 says that player i can assign a probability to each of j’s cells,
given his information. A4 says that primitive propositions (as interpreted by player
i) are measurable according to player i.
2.3 Prior-generated beliefs and the common-prior assumption
One assumption that we do not necessarily make, but want to examine in this
framework, is the common-prior assumption. The common-prior assumption is
an instance of a more general assumption, that beliefs are generated from a prior,
which we now define. The intuition is that players start with a prior probability;
they then update the prior in light of their information. Player i’s information is
captured by her partition Πi. Thus, if i’s prior is νi, then we would expect µi,ω to
be νi(· | Πi(ω)).
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Definition 2.1 An epistemic probability structure M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (πj)j∈N )
has prior-generated beliefs (generated by (F1, ν1), . . . , (Fn, νn)) if, for each player
i, there exist probability spaces (Ω,Fi, νi) such that
• for all i, j ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, Πj(ω) ∈ Fi;
• for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, Pi(ω) = (Πi(ω),Fi | Πi(ω), µi,ω), where Fi |
Πi(ω) is the restriction of Fi to Πi(ω),3 and µi,ω(E) = νi(E | Πi(ω)) for
all E ∈ Fi | Πi(ω) if νi(Πi(ω)) > 0. (There are no constraints on νi,ω if
νi(Πi(ω)) = 0.)
It is easy to check that if M has prior-generated beliefs, then M satisfies A1, A2,
and A3. More interestingly for our purposes, the converse also holds for a large
class of structures. Say that a structure is countably partitioned if for each player
i, the information partition Πi has countably many elements, i.e., Πi is a finite or
countably infinite collection of subsets of Ω.
Proposition 2.2 If a structure M has prior-generated beliefs, then M satisfies
A1, A2, and A3. Moreover, every countably partitioned structure that satisfies
A1, A2, and A3 is one with prior-generated beliefs, with the priors νi satisfying
νi(Πi(ω)) > 0 for each player i ∈ N and state ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. The first part is immediate. To prove the second claim, suppose that
M is a structure satisfying A1–A3. Let Fi be the unique algebra generated by
∪ω∈ΩFi,ω . To define νi, if there are Ni < ∞ cells in the partition Πi, define
νi(ω) =
1
Ni
µi,ω(ω). Otherwise, if the collection Πi is countably infinite, order
the elements of Πi as p1i , p2i , . . .. Choose some state ωk ∈ pki for each k, with
associated probability space Pi(ωk) = (Ωi,ωk ,Fi,ωk , µi,ωk). By A2, each choice
of ωk in pki gives the same probability measure µi,ωk . Define νi =
∑
k
1
2k
µi,ωk .
It is easy to see that νi is a probability measure on Ω, and that M is generated by
(F1, ν1), . . . , (Fn, νn).
Note that the requirement that that M is countably partitioned is necessary to
ensure that we can have νi(Πi(ω)) > 0 for each player i and state ω.
In light of Proposition 2.2, when it is convenient, we will talk of a structure
satisfying A1–A3 as being generated by (F1, ν1), . . . , (Fn, νn).
The common-prior assumption is essentially just the special case of prior-
generated beliefs where all the priors are identical. We make one additional tech-
nical assumption. To state this assumption, we need one more definition. A state
3Recall that the restriction of Fi to Πi(ω) is the σ-algebra {B ∩Πi(ω) : B ∈ Fi}.
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ω′ ∈ Ω is G-reachable from ω ∈ Ω, for G ⊆ N , if there exists a sequence
ω0, . . . , ωm in Ω with ω0 = ω and ωm = ω′, and i1, . . . , im ∈ G such that
ωℓ ∈ Πiℓ(ωℓ−1). Denote by RG(ω) ⊆ Ω the set of states G-reachable from ω.
Definition 2.3 An epistemic probability structure M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (πj)j∈N )
satisfies the common-prior assumption (CPA) if there exists a probability space
(Ω,F , ν) such thatM has prior-generated beliefs generated by ((F , ν), . . . , (F , ν)),
and ν(RN (ω)) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
As shown by Halpern [2002], the assumption that ν(RN (ω)) > 0 for each ω ∈ Ω
is needed for Aumann’s [1976] impossibility result.
2.4 Capturing ambiguity
We use epistemic probability structures to give meaning to formulas. Since primi-
tive propositions are interpreted relative to players, we must allow the interpretation
of arbitrary formulas to depend on the player as well. Exactly how we do this de-
pends on what further assumptions we make about what players know about each
other’s interpretations. There are many assumptions that could be made. We focus
on two of them here, ones that we believe arise in applications of interest, and then
reconsider them under the assumption that there may be some ambiguity about the
partitions.
Believing there is no ambiguity The first approach is appropriate for situations
where players may interpret statements differently, but it does not occur to them
that there is another way of interpreting the statement. Thus, in this model, if
there is a public announcement, all players will think that their interpretation of the
announcement is common knowledge. We write (M,ω, i) out ϕ to denote that ϕ
is true at state ω according to player i (that is, according to i’s interpretation of the
primitive propositions in ϕ). The superscript out denotes outermost scope, since
the formulas are interpreted relative to the “outermost” player, namely the player i
on the left-hand side of out . We define out , as usual, by induction.
If p is a primitive proposition,
(M,ω, i) out p iff πi(ω)(p) = true.
This just says that player i interprets a primitive proposition p according to his
interpretation function πi. This clause is common to all our approaches for dealing
with ambiguity.
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For conjunction and negation, as is standard,
(M,ω, i) out ¬ϕ iff (M,ω, i) 6 outϕ,
(M,ω, i) out ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,ω, i) out ϕ and (M,ω, i) out ψ.
Now consider a probability formula of the form a1pr j(ϕ1)+. . .+akpr j(ϕk) ≥
b. The key feature that distinguishes this semantics is how i interprets j’s beliefs.
This is where we capture the intuition that it does not occur to i that there is another
way of interpreting the formulas other than the way she does. Let
[[ϕ]]outi = {ω : (M,ω, i) 
out ϕ}.
Thus, [[ϕ]]outi is the event consisting of the set of states where ϕ is true, according
to i. Note that A1 and A3 guarantee that the restriction of Ωj,ω to Πi(ω) belongs
to Fi,ω . Assume inductively that [[ϕ1]]outi ∩ Ωj,ω, . . . , [[ϕk]]outi ∩ Ωj,ω ∈ Fj,ω.
The base case of this induction, where ϕ is a primitive proposition, is immediate
from A3 and A4, and the induction assumption clearly extends to negations and
conjunctions. We now define
(M,ω, i) out a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . .+ akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b iff
a1µj,ω([[ϕ1]]
out
i ∩ Ωj,ω) + . . .+ akµj,ω([[ϕk]]
out
i ∩ Ωj,ω) ≥ b.
Note that it easily follows from A2 that (M,ω, i) out a1pr j(ϕ1)+. . .+akpr j(ϕk) ≥
b if and only if (M,ω′, i) out a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . . + akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b for all ω′ ∈
Πj(ω). Thus, [[a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . . + akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b]]i is a union of cells of Πj , and
hence [[a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . .+ akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b]]i ∩ Ωj,ω ∈ Fj,ω.
With this semantics, according to player i, player j assigns ϕ probability b
if and only if the set of worlds where ϕ holds according to i has probability b
according to j. Intuitively, although i “understands” j’s probability space, player
i is not aware that j may interpret ϕ differently from the way she (i) does. That i
understands j’s probability space is plausible if we assume that there is a common
prior and that i knows j’s partition (this knowledge is embodied in the assumption
that i intersects [[ϕk]]outi with Ωj,ω when assessing what probability j assigns to
ϕk).4
4Note that at state ω, player i will not in general know that it is state ω. In particular, even if
we assume that i knows which element of j’s partition contains ω, i will not in general know which
of j’s cells describes j’s current information. But we assume that i does know that if the state is
ω, then j information is described by Ωj,ω . Thus, as usual, “(M, i, ω) out ϕ” should perhaps be
understood as “according to i, ϕ is true if the actual world is ω”. This interpretational issue arises
even without ambiguity in the picture.
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Given our interpretation of probability formulas, the interpretation of Bjϕ and
EBkϕ follows. For example,
(M,ω, i) out Bjϕ iff µj,ω([[ϕ]]outi ) = 1.
For readers more used to belief defined in terms of a possibility relation, note that
if the probability measure µj,ω is discrete (i.e., all sets are µj,ω-measurable, and
µj,ω(E) =
∑
ω′∈E µj,ω(ω
′) for all subsets E ⊂ Πj(ω)), we can define Bj =
{(ω, ω′) : µj,ω(ω
′) > 0}; that is, (ω, ω′) ∈ Bj if, in state ω, agent j gives state ω′
positive probability. In that case, (M,ω, i) out Bjϕ iff (M,ω′, i) out ϕ for all
ω′ such that (ω, ω′) ∈ Bj . That is, (M,ω, i) out Bjϕ iff ϕ is true according to i
in all the worlds to which j assigns positive probability at ω.
It is important to note that (M,ω, i)  ϕ does not imply (M,ω, i)  Biϕ:
while (M,ω, i) out ϕ means “ϕ is true at ω according to i’s interpretation,” this
does not mean that i believes ϕ at state ω. The reason is that i can be uncertain as
to which state is the actual state. For i to believe ϕ at ω, ϕ would have to be true
(according to i’s interpretation) at all states to which i assigns positive probability.
Finally, we define
(M,ω, i) out CBGϕ iff (M,ω, i) out EBkGϕ for k = 1, 2, . . .
for any nonempty subset G ⊆ N of players.
Awareness of possible ambiguity We now consider the second way of interpret-
ing formulas. This is appropriate for players who realize that other players may
interpret formulas differently. We write (M,ω, i) in ϕ to denote that ϕ is true
at state ω according to player i using this interpretation, which is called innermost
scope. The definition of in is identical to that of out except for the interpretation
of probability formulas. In this case, we have
(M,ω, i) in a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . .+ akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b iff
a1µj,ω([[ϕ1]]
in
j ∩Ωj,ω) + . . .+ akµj,ω([[ϕk]]
in
j ∩ Ωj,ω) ≥ b,
where [[ϕ]]inj is the set of states ω such that (M,ω, j) in ϕ. Hence, according
to player i, player j assigns ϕ probability b if and only if the set of worlds where
ϕ holds according to j has probability b according to j. Intuitively, now i realizes
that j may interpret ϕ differently from the way that she (i) does, and thus assumes
that j uses his (j’s) interpretation to evaluate the probability of ϕ. Again, in the
case that µj,ω is discrete, this means that (M,ω, i) in Bjϕ iff (M,ω′, j) in ϕ
for all ω′ such that (ω, ω′) ∈ Bj .
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Note for future reference that if ϕ is a probability formula or a formula of the
form CBGϕ′, then it is easy to see that (M,ω, i) in ϕ if and only if (M,ω, j) in
ϕ; we sometimes write (M,ω) in ϕ in this case. Clearly, out and in agree in
the common-interpretation case, and we can write .
Ambiguity about information partitions Up to now, we have assumed that
players “understand” each other’s probability spaces. This may not be so reason-
able in the presence of ambiguity and prior-generated beliefs. We want to model
the following type of situation. Players receive information, or signals, about the
true state of the world, in the form of strings (formulas). Each player understands
what signals he and other players receive in different states of the world, but play-
ers may interpret signals differently. For instance, player i may understand that j
sees a red car if ω is the true state of the world, but i may or may not be aware that
j has a different interpretation of “red” than i does. In the latter case, i does not
have a full understanding of j’s information structure.
We would like to think of a player’s information as being characterized by a
formula (intuitively, the formula that describes the signals received). Even if the
formulas that describe each information set are commonly known, in the presence
of ambiguity, they might be interpreted differently.
To make this precise, let Φ∗ be the set of formulas that is obtained from Φ by
closing off under negation and conjunction. That is, Φ∗ consists of all proposi-
tional formulas that can be formed from the primitive propositions in Φ. Since the
formulas in Φ∗ are not composed of probability formulas, and thus do not involve
any reasoning about interpretations, we can extend the function πi(·) to Φ∗ in a
straightforward way, and write [[ϕ]]i for the set of the states of the world where the
formula ϕ ∈ Φ∗ is true according to i.
The key new assumption we make to model players’ imperfect understanding
of the other players’ probability spaces is that i’s partition cell at ω is described by
a formula ϕi,ω ∈ Φ∗. But, of course, this formula may be interpreted differently by
each player. We want Πi(ω) to coincide with i’s interpretation of the formula ϕi,ω.
If player j understands that i may be using a different interpretation than he does
(i.e., the appropriate semantics are the innermost-scope semantics), then j correctly
infers that the set of states that i thinks are possible in ω is Πi(ω) = [[ϕi,ω]]i. But
if j does not understand that i may interpret formulas in a different way (i.e., under
outermost scope), then he thinks that the set of states that i thinks are possible in
ω is given by [[ϕi,ω]]j , and, of course, [[ϕi,ω]]j may not coincide with Πi(ω). In
any case, we require that j understand that these formulas form a partition and that
ω belongs to [[ϕi,ω]]j . Thus, we consider structures that satisfy A5 and A6 (for
outermost scope) or A5 and A6’ (for innermost scope), in addition to A1–A4.
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A5. For each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, there is a formula ϕi,ω ∈ Φ∗ such that Πi(ω) =
[[ϕi,ω]]i.
A6. For each i, j ∈ N , the collection {[[ϕi,ω]]j : ω ∈ Ω} is a partition of Ω and
for all ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ [[ϕi,ω]]j .
A6′. For each i ∈ N , the collection {[[ϕi,ω ]]i : ω ∈ Ω} is a partition of Ω and for
all ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ [[ϕi,ω]]i.
Assumption A6 is appropriate for outermost scope: it presumes that player j uses
his own interpretation of ϕi,ω in deducing the beliefs for i in ω. Assumption A6′
is appropriate for innermost scope. Note that A6′ is a weakening of A6. While
A6 requires the signals for player i to induce an information partition according
to every player j, the weaker version A6′ requires this to hold only for player i
himself.
We can now define analogues of outermost scope and innermost scope in the
presence of ambiguous information. Thus, we define two more truth relations,

out ,ai and in,ai . (The “ai” here stands for “ambiguity of information”.) The only
difference between out ,ai and out is in the semantics of probability formulas.
In giving the semantics in a structure M , we assume that M has prior-generated
beliefs, generated by (F1, ν1), . . . , (Fn, νn). As we observed in Proposition 2.2,
this assumption is without loss of generality as long as the structure is countably
partitioned. However, the choice of prior beliefs is relevant, as we shall see, so
we have to be explicit about them. When i evaluates j’s probability at a state
ω, instead of using νj,ω, player i uses νj(· | [[ϕj,ω]]i). When i = j, these two
approaches agree, but in general they do not. Thus, assuming that M satisfies A5
and A6 (which are the appropriate assumptions for the outermost-scope semantics),
we have
(M,ω, i) out ,ai a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . .+ akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b iff
a1νj([[ϕ1]]
out ,ai
i | [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i ) + . . .
+akνj([[ϕk]]
out ,ai
i | [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i ) ≥ b,
where [[ψ]]out ,aii = {ω′ : (M,ω, i) out ,ai ψ}.
That is, at ω ∈ Ω, player j receives the information (a string) ϕj,ω, which he
interprets as [[ϕj,ω]]j . Player i understands that j receives the information ϕj,ω in
state ω, but interprets this as [[ϕj,ω]]i. This models a situation such as the following.
In state ω, player j sees a red car, and thinks possible all states of the world where
he sees a car that is red (according to j). Player i knows that at world ω player
j will see a red car (although she may not know that the actual world is ω, and
thus does not know what color of car player j actually sees). However, i has a
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somewhat different interpretation of “red car” (or, more precisely, of j seeing a red
car) than j; i’s interpretation corresponds to the event [[ϕj,ω]]i. Since i understands
that j’s beliefs are determined by conditioning her prior νj on her information, i
can compute what she believes j’s beliefs are.
We can define in,ai in an analogous way. Thus, the semantics for formulas
that do not involve probability formulas are as given by in , while the semantics of
probability formulas is defined as follows (where M is assumed to satisfy A5 and
A6′, which are the appropriate assumptions for the innermost-scope semantics):
(M,ω, i) in,ai a1pr j(ϕ1) + . . .+ akpr j(ϕk) ≥ b iff
a1νj([[ϕ1]]
in,ai
j | [[ϕj,ω]]
in,ai
j ) + . . .
+akνj([[ϕk]]
in,ai
j | [[ϕj,ω]]
in,ai
j ) ≥ b.
Note that although we have written [[ϕj,ω]]in,aii , since ϕj,ω is a propositional for-
mula, [[ϕj,ω]]in,aii = [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i = [[ϕj,ω]]
out
i = [[ϕj,ω]]
in
i . It is important that
ϕj,ω is a propositional formula here; otherwise, we would have circularities in the
definition, and would somehow need to define [[ϕj,ω]]in,aii .
Again, here it may be instructive to consider the definition of Bjϕ in the case
that µj,ω is discrete for all ω. In this case, Bj becomes the set {(ω, ω′) : νj(ω′ |
[[ϕj,ω]]
in,ai
j ) > 0. That is, state ω′ is considered possible by player j in state
ω if agent j gives ω′ positive probability after conditioning his prior νj on (his
interpretation of) the information ϕj,ω he receives in state ω. With this definition
of Bj , we have, as expected, (M,ω, i) in,ai Bjϕ iff (M,ω′, i) in,ai ϕ for all ω′
such that (ω, ω′) ∈ Bj .
The differences in the different semantics arise only when we consider prob-
ability formulas. If we go back to our example with the red car, we now have a
situation where player j sees a red car in state ω, and thinks possible all states
where he sees a red car. Player i knows that in state ω, player j sees a car that he
(j) interprets to be red, and that this determines his posterior. Since i understands
j’s notion of seeing a red car, she has a correct perception of j’s posterior in each
state of the world. Thus, the semantics for in,ai are identical to those for in
(restricted to the class of structures with prior-generated beliefs that satisfy A5 and
A6′), though the information partitions are not predefined, but rather generated by
the signals.
Note that, given an epistemic structure M satisfying A1–A4, there are many
choices for νi that allow M to be viewed as being generated by prior beliefs. All
that is required of νj is that for all ω ∈ Ω and E ∈ Fj,ω such thatE ⊆ [[ϕj,ω]]out ,aij ,
it holds that νj(E ∩ [[ϕj,ω]]out ,aij )/νj([[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
j ) = µj,ω(E). However, because
[[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i may not be a subset of [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
j = Πj(ω), we can have two prior
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probabilities νj and ν ′j that generate the same posterior beliefs for j, and still have
νj([[ϕk]]
out ,ai
i | [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i ) 6= ν
′
j([[ϕk]]
out ,ai
i | [[ϕj,ω]]
out ,ai
i ) for some formulas
ϕk. Thus, we must be explicit about our choice of priors here.
3 The common-prior assumption revisited
This section applies the framework developed in the previous sections to under-
stand the implications of assuming a common prior when there is ambiguity. The
application in Section 3.1 makes use of the outermost- and innermost-scope se-
mantics, while Section 3.2 considers a setting with ambiguity about information
partitions.
3.1 Agreeing to Disagree
The first application we consider concerns the result of Aumann [1976] that players
cannot “agree to disagree” if they have a common prior. As we show now, this is no
longer true if players can have different interpretations. But exactly what “agreeing
to disagree” means depends on which semantics we use.
Example 3.1 [Agreeing to Disagree] Consider a structure M with a single state
ω, such that π1(ω)(p) = true and π2(ω)(p) = false. Clearly M satisfies the
CPA. The fact that there is only a single state inM means that, although the players
interpret p differently, there is perfect understanding of how p is interpreted by each
player. Specifically, taking G = {1, 2}, we have that (M,ω) in CBG(B1p ∧
B2¬p). Thus, with innermost scope, according to each player, there is common
belief that they have different beliefs at state ω; that is, they agree to disagree.
With outermost scope, we do not have an agreement to disagree in the standard
sense, but the players do disagree on what they have common belief about. Specif-
ically, (M,ω, 1) out CBGp and (M,ω, 2) out CBG¬p. That is, according to
player 1, there is common belief of p; and according to player 2, there is common
belief of ¬p. To us, it seems that we have modeled a rather common situation here!
Note that in the model of Example 3.1, there is maximal ambiguity: the players
disagree with probability 1. We also have complete disagreement. As the following
result shows, the less disagreement there is in the interpretation of events, the closer
the players come to not being able to agree to disagree. Suppose that M satisfies
the CPA, where ν is the common prior, and that ϕ ∈ Φ∗ (so that ϕ is a propositional
formula). Say that ϕ is only ǫ-ambiguous in M if the set of states where the players
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disagree on the interpretation of ϕ has ν-measure at most ǫ; that is,
ν({ω : ∃i, j((M,ω, i)  ϕ and (M,ω, j)  ¬ϕ})}) ≤ ǫ.
We write  here because, as we observed before, all the semantic approaches agree
on propositional formulas, so this definition makes sense independent of the se-
mantic approach used. Note that if players have a common interpretation, then all
formulas are 0-ambiguous.
Proposition 3.2 If M satisfies the CPA and ϕ is only ǫ-ambiguous in M , then
there cannot exist players i and j, numbers b and b′ with b′ > b+ ǫ, and a state ω
such that all states are G-reachable from ω and
(M,ω) in CBG((pr i(ϕ) < b) ∧ (pr j(ϕ) > b
′)).
Proof. Essentially the same arguments as those used by Aumann [1976] can be
used to show that if all states are reachable from ω and (M,ω) in CBG(pr i(ϕ) <
b), then it must be the case that ν([[ϕ]]i) < b, where ν is the common prior. Sim-
ilarly, ν([[ϕ]]j) > b′. This contradicts the assumption that ϕ is only ǫ-ambiguous
in M .
3.2 Understanding differences in beliefs
Since our framework separates meaning from message, it is worth asking what
happens if players receive the same message, but interpret it differently. Aumann
[1987] has argued that “people with different information may legitimately enter-
tain different probabilities, but there is no rational basis for people who have always
been fed precisely the same information to do so.” Here we show that this is no
longer true when information is ambiguous, even if players have a common prior
and fully understand the ambiguity that they face, except under strong assumptions
on players’ beliefs about the information that others receive. This could happen
if players with exactly the same background and information can interpret things
differently, and thus have different beliefs.
We assume that information partitions are generated by signals, which may be
ambiguous. That is, in each state of the world ω, each player i receives some sig-
nal σi,ω that determines the states of the world he thinks possible; that is, Πi(ω) =
[[reci(σi,ω)]]i, where reci(σi,ω) ∈ Φ∗ is “i received σi,ω.” As usual, we restrict at-
tention to structures with prior-generated beliefs that satisfy A5 and A6′ when con-
sidering innermost-scope semantics and A5 and A6 when considering outermost-
scope semantics.
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In any given state, the signals that determine the states that players think are
possible may be the same or may differ across players. Following Aumann [1987],
we are particularly interested in the former case. Formally, we say that σω is a
common signal in ω if σi,ω = σω for all i ∈ N . For example, if players have a
common interpretation, and all players observe a red car in state ω, then σω is “red
car”, while reci(σω) is “i observes a car that is red.” The fact that “red car” is
a common signal in ω means that all players in fact observe a red car in state ω.
But assuming that players have received a common signal does not imply that they
have the same posteriors, as the next example shows:
Example 3.3 There are two players, 1 and 2, and three states, labeled ω1, ω2, ω3.
The common prior gives each state equal probability, and players have the same
interpretation. In ω1, both players receive signal σ; in ω2, only 1 does; in ω3, only
2 receives σ. The primitive proposition p is true in ω1 and ω2, and the primitive
proposition q is true in ω1 and ω3. In state ω1, both players receive signal σ, but
player 1 assigns probability 1 to p and probability 1
2
to q, while 2 gives probability
1
2
to p and probability 1 to q.
Thus, players who receive a common signal can end up having a different posterior
over formulas, even if they have a common prior and the same interpretation. The
problem is that even though players have received the same signal, they do not
know that the other has received it, and they do not know that the other knows they
have received it, and so on. That is, the fact that players have received a common
signal in ω does not imply that the signal is common knowledge in ω. We say
that signal σ is a public signal at state ω if (M,ω)  CBN (∧i∈Nreci(σ)): it is
commonly believed at ω that all players received σ.
For the remainder of this section, we will be considering structures with a com-
mon prior ν. To avoid dealing with topological issues, we assume that ν is a dis-
crete measure. Of course, if the common prior ν is discrete, then so are all the
measures µi,ω. Let Supp(µ) denote the support of the probability measure µ. If µ
is discrete, then Supp(µ) = {ω : µ(ω) 6= 0}.
Even though common signals are not sufficient for players to have the same
beliefs, as Example 3.3 demonstrates, Aumann’s claim does hold for common-
interpretation structures if players receive a public signal (provided that they started
with a common prior):
Proposition 3.4 If M is a common-interpretation structure with a common prior,
and σ is a public signal at ω, then players’ posteriors are identical at ω: for all
i, j ∈ N and E ∈ F ,
µi,ω(E ∩Πi(ω)) = µj,ω(E ∩Πj(ω)).
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In particular, for any formula ϕ,
µi,ω([[ϕ]] ∩Πi(ω)) = µj,ω([[ϕ]] ∩Πj(ω)).
Proof. Let ν be the common prior in M . By assumption, Πi(ω) = [[reci(σ)]] for
all players i ∈ N . Since σ is public, we have that (M,ω)  Bi(recj(σ)). Thus,
(M,ω′)  recj(σ) for all ω′ ∈ Supp(µi,ω). It follows that Supp(µi,ω) ⊆ Πj(ω)
for all players i and j. Since µi,ω(Supp(µi,ω)) = 1, we have that ν(Πj(ω) |
Πi(ω)) = ν(Πi(ω) | Πj(ω)) = 1. Thus, for all E ∈ F , we must have ν(E |
Πi(ω)) = ν(E | Πj(ω). The result now follows immediately.
There is another way of formalizing the assumption that (it is commonly be-
lieved that) players are “ fed the same information”; namely, we say that if one
player i receives a signal σ then so do all others. Formally, a signal σ is a shared
signal at state ω if (M,ω)  ∧i,j∈NCBN(reci(σ) ⇔ recj(σ)). If there is no am-
biguity, a signal is shared iff it is public; we leave the straightforward proof (which
uses ideas from the proof of Proposition 3.4) to the reader.
Proposition 3.5 If M is a common-interpretation structure, and σω is received at
state ω by all players, then σω is a public signal at ω iff σ is a shared signal at ω.
The assumption that signals are public or shared is quite strong: one requires com-
mon belief that a particular signal is received (and so precludes any uncertainties
about what one player believes that other players believe that others have received),
while the other requires common belief that different players always receive the
same signal (and, similarly, precludes uncertainties about what is received).
What happens if we introduce ambiguity? If the signal itself is a propositional
formula (which is the case in many cases of interest), then players may interpret
the signal differently; that is, we may have [[σω]]i 6= [[σω]]j for i 6= j. Moreover,
players may have a different interpretation of observing a given signal, i.e., it is
possible that [[reci(σω)]]i 6= [[reci(σω)]]j . Going back to our example of the red
car, different players may interpret “red car” differently, and they may interpret the
notion of observing a red car differently. In addition, it is now possible that players
have the same posteriors over events, but not over formulas, or vice versa, given
that they may interpret formulas differently.
If we assume that players are not aware that there is ambiguity, then we retain
the equivalence between shared signals and common signals, and players’ posteri-
ors over formulas coincide after receiving a public signal. However, they may have
different beliefs over events:
Proposition 3.6 If M is a structure satisfying A5 and A6, and σ is received at state
ω by all players, then σ is a public signal at ω iff σ is a shared signal at ω under
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outermost-scope semantics. Moreover, if M has a common prior, and σ is a public
signal at ω, then players’ posteriors on formulas are identical at ω; that is, for all
formulas ψ, we have
µi,ω([[ψ]]
out ,ai
i ∩Πi(ω)) = µj,ω([[ψ]]
out ,ai
j ∩Πj(ω)).
However, players’ posteriors on events may differ; that is, there may exist some E
such that
µi,ω(E ∩Πi(ω)) 6= µj,ω(E ∩Πj(ω)).
We leave the straightforward arguments to the reader.
The situation for innermost scope presents an interesting contrast. A first ob-
servation is that public signals and shared signals are no longer equivalent:
Example 3.7 Consider a structure M with two players, whereΩ = {ω11, ω12, ω21, ω22}.
Suppose that [[rec1(σ)]]1 = [[rec2(σ)]]1 = {ω11, ω12}, and [[rec1(σ)]]2 = [[rec2(σ)]]2 =
{ω11, ω21}. Assume that the beliefs in M are generated by a common prior that
gives each state probability 1/4. Clearly (M,ω11) in,ai CBN(rec1(σ)⇔ rec2(σ))∧
¬CBN (rec1(σ)).
The problem in Example 3.7 is that, although the signal is shared, the players don’t
interpret receiving the signal the same way. It is not necessarily the case that player
1 received σ from player 1’s point of view iff player 2 received σ from player 2’s
point of view. The assumption that players receive shared signals is not strong
enough to ensure that they have identical posteriors, either over formulas or over
events. In Example 3.7, for example, players clearly have different posteriors on
the event {ω11, ω12} in state ω11; similarly, it is not hard to show that players can
have different posteriors over formulas. Say that σ is strongly shared at state ω if
• (M,ω) in,ai ∧i,jCBN (reci(σ)⇔ recj(σ)); and
• (M,ω) in,ai ∧i,jCBN (Bi(reci(σ))⇔ Bj(recj(σ))).
The second clause says that it is commonly believed at ω that each player believes
that he has received σ iff each of the other players believes that he has received
σ. This clause is implied by the first in common-interpretation structures and with
outermost scope, but not with innermost scope.
Proposition 3.8 If M is a structure satisfying A5 and A6′, and σ is received at ω
by all players, then σ is a public signal at ω iff σ is a strongly shared signal at ω
under the innermost-scope semantics. If M is a structure with a common prior and
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σ is a public signal at ω, then players’ posteriors over events are identical at ω:
for all i, j ∈ N and all E ∈ F ,
µi,ω(E ∩Πi(ω)) = µj,ω(E ∩Πj(ω)).
However, players’ posteriors on formulas may differ; that is, for some formula ψ,
we could have that
µi,ω([[ψ]]
in,ai
i ∩Πi(ω)) 6= µj,ω([[ψ]]
in,ai
j ∩Πj(ω)).
These results emphasize the effect of ambiguity on shared and public signals.
4 Common priors or common interpretations?
As Example 3.1 shows, we can have agreement to disagree with ambiguity un-
der the in semantics (and thus, also the in,ai semantics). We also know that
we can do this by having heterogeneous priors. As we now show, structures
with ambiguity that satisfy the CPA have the same expressive power as common-
interpretation structures that do not necessarily satisfy the CPA (and common-
interpretation structures, by definition, have no ambiguity). On the other hand,
common-interpretation structures with heterogeneous priors are more general than
structures with ambiguity and common priors.
To make this precise, we consider what formulas are valid in structures with
or without ambiguity or a common prior. To define what it means for a formula
to be valid, we need some more notation. Fix a nonempty, countable set Ψ of
primitive propositions, and let M(Ψ) be the class of all structures that satisfy A1–
A4 and that are defined over some nonempty subset Φ of Ψ such that Ψ \ Φ is
countably infinite.5 Given a subset Φ of Ψ, a formula ϕ ∈ LCn (Φ), and a structure
M ∈ M(Ψ) over Φ, we say that ϕ is valid in M according to outermost scope, and
write M out ϕ, if (M,ω, i) out ϕ for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N . Given ϕ ∈ Ψ, say
that ϕ is valid according to outermost scope in a class N ⊆ M(Ψ) of structures,
and write N out ϕ, if M out ϕ for all M ∈ N defined over a set Φ ⊂ Ψ of
primitive propositions that includes all the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ.
We get analogous definitions by replacing out by in , out ,ai and in,ai
throughout (in the latter two cases, we have to restrict N to structures that sat-
isfy A5 and A6 or A6′, respectively, in addition to A1–A4). Finally, given a class
5Most of our results hold if we just consider the set of structures defined over some fixed set Φ
of primitive propositions. However, for one of our results, we need to be able to add fresh primitive
propositions to the language. Thus, we allow the set Φ of primitive propositions to vary over the
structures we consider, but require Ψ \ Φ to be countably infinite so that there are always “fresh”
primitive propositions that we can add to the language.
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of structures N , let Nc be the subclass of N in which players have a common in-
terpretation. Thus, Mc(Ψ) denotes the structures in M(Ψ) with a common inter-
pretation. Let Mai (Ψ) denote all structures in M(Ψ) with prior-generated beliefs
that satisfy A5 and A6 (where we assume that the prior ν that describes the initial
beliefs is given explicitly).6 Finally, let Mcpa (Ψ) (resp., Mcpa,ai (Ψ)) consist of
the structures in M(Ψ) (resp., Mai (Ψ)) satisfying the CPA.
Proposition 4.1 For all formulas ϕ ∈ LCn (Ψ), the following are equivalent:
(a) Mc(Ψ)  ϕ;
(b) M(Ψ) out ϕ;
(c) M(Ψ) in ϕ;
(d) Maic (Ψ)  ϕ;
(e) Mai (Ψ) out ,ai ϕ;
(f) Mai (Ψ) in,ai ϕ.
Proof. Since the set of structures with a common interpretation is a subset of the
set of structures, it is immediate that (c) and (b) both imply (a). Similarly, (e) and
(f) both imply (d). The fact that (a) implies (b) is also immediate. For suppose
that Mc(Ψ)  ϕ and that M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (πj)j∈N ) ∈ M(Ψ) is a
structure over a set Φ ⊂ Ψ of primitive propositions that contains the primitive
propositions that appear in ϕ. We must show that M out ϕ. Thus, we must show
that (M,ω, i) out ϕ for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N . Fix ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N , and
let M ′i = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (π′j)j∈N ), where π′j = πi for all j. Thus, M ′i is
a common-interpretation structure over Φ, where the interpretation coincides with
i’s interpretation in M . Clearly M ′i satisfies A1–A4, so M ′i ∈ Mc(Ψ). It is easy
to check that (M,ω, i) out ψ if and only if (M ′i , ω, i)  ψ for all states ω ∈ Ω
and all formulas ψ ∈ LCn (Φ). Since M ′i  ϕ, we must have that (M,ω, i) out ϕ,
as desired.
To see that (a) implies (c), given a structure M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , (πj)j∈N ) ∈
M(Ψ) over some set Φ ⊂ Ψ of primitive propositions and a player j ∈ N , let Ωj
be a disjoint copy of Ω; that is, for every state ω ∈ Ω, there is a corresponding state
ωj ∈ Ωj . Let Ω′ = Ω1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ωn. Given E ⊆ Ω, let the corresponding subset
Ej ⊆ Ωj be the set {ωj : ω ∈ E}, and let E′ be the subset of Ω′ corresponding to
E, that is, E′ = {ωj : ω ∈ E, j ∈ N}.
6For ease of exposition, we assume A6 even when dealing with innermost scope. Recall that A6
implies A6′, which is actually the appropriate assumption for innermost scope.
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Define M ′ = (Ω′, (Π′j)j∈N , (P ′j)j∈N , (π′j)j∈N ), where Ω′ = Ω1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ωn
and, for all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ N , we have
• Π′i(ωj) = (Πi(ω))
′;
• πi(ωj)(p) = πj(ω)(p) for a primitive proposition p ∈ Φ;
• P ′i(ωj) = (Ω
′
i,ωj
,F ′i,ωj , µ
′
i,ωj
), where Ω′i,ωj = Ω
′
i,ω, F
′
i,ωj
= {Eℓ : E ∈
Fi,ω, ℓ ∈ N}, µ
′
i,ωj
(Ei) = µi,ω(E), µ
′
i,ωj
(Eℓ) = 0 if ℓ 6= i.
Thus, π1 = · · · = πn, so that M ′ is a common-interpretation structure; on a
state ωj , these interpretations are all determined by πj . Also note that the support
of the probability measure µ′i,ωj is contained in Ωi, so for different players i, the
probability measures µ′i,ωj have disjoint supports. Now an easy induction on the
structure of formulas shows that(M ′, ωj)  ψ if and only if (M,ω, j) in ψ for
any formula ψ ∈ LCn (Φ). It easily follows that if M ′  ϕ, then M in ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ LCn (Φ).
The argument that (d) implies (e) is essentially identical to the argument that (a)
implies (b); similarly, the argument that (d) implies (f) is essentially the same as the
argument that (a) implies (c). Since Maic (Ψ) ⊆ Mc(Ψ), (a) implies (d). To show
that (d) implies (a), suppose that Maic (Ψ)  ϕ for some formula ϕ ∈ LCn (Ψ).
Given a structure M = (Ω, (Πj)j∈N , (Pj)j∈N , π) ∈ Mc(Ψ) over a set Φ ⊂ Ψ
of primitive propositions that includes the primitive propositions that appear in
ϕ, we want to show that (M,ω, i)  ϕ for each state ω ∈ Ω and player i.
Fix ω. Recall that RN (ω) consists of the set of states N -reachable from ω. Let
M ′ = (RN (ω), (Π
′
j)j∈N , (P
′
j)j∈N , π
′), with Π′j and P ′j the restriction of Πj and
Pj , respectively, to the states in RN (ω), be a structure over a set Φ′ of primitive
propositions, where Φ′ contains Φ and new primitive propositions that we call pi,ω
for each player i and state ω ∈ RN (ω).7 Note that there are only countably many
information sets in RN (ω), so Φ′ is countable. Define π′ so that it agrees with
π (restricted to RN (ω)) on the propositions in Φ, and so that [[pi,ω]]i = Πi(ω).
Thus, M ′ satisfies A5 and A6. It is easy to check that, for all ω′ ∈ RN (ω) and
all formulas ψ ∈ LCn (Φ), we have that (M,ω′, i)  ψ iff (M ′, ω′, i)  ψ. Since
M ′  ϕ, it follows that (M,ω, i)  ϕ, as desired.
The proof that (a) implies (c) shows that, starting from an arbitrary structure
M , we can construct a common-interpretation structure M ′ that is equivalent to
7This is the one argument that needs the assumption that the set of primitive propositions can
be different in different structures in M(Ψ), and the fact that every Ψ \ Φ is countable. We have
assumed for simplicity that the propositions pi,ω are all in Ψ\Φ, and that they can be chosen in such
a way so that Ψ \ (Φ ∪ {pi,ω : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ω ∈ Ω}) is countable.
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M in the sense that the same formulas hold in both models. Note that because the
probability measures in the structure M ′ constructed in the proof of Proposition 4.1
have disjoint support, M ′ does not satisfy the CPA, even if the original structure
M does. As the next result shows, this is not an accident.
Proposition 4.2 For all formulas ϕ ∈ LCn (Ψ), if eitherMcpa (Ψ) out ϕ,Mcpa(Ψ) in
ϕ, Mcpa,ai (Ψ) out ,ai ϕ, or Mcpa,ai (Ψ) in,ai ϕ, then Mcpac (Ψ)  ϕ. Moreover,
if Mcpac (Ψ)  ϕ, then Mcpa (Ψ) out ϕ and Mcpa,ai (Ψ) out ,ai ϕ. However, in
general, if Mcpac (Ψ)  ϕ, then it may not be the case that Mcpa (Ψ) in ϕ.
Proof. All the implications are straightforward, with proofs along the same lines
as that of Proposition 4.1. To prove the last claim, let p ∈ Ψ be a primitive proposi-
tion. Aumann’s agreeing to disagree result shows that Mcpac (Ψ)  ¬CBG(B1p ∧
B2¬p), while Example 3.1 shows that Mcpa(Ψ) 6 in¬CBG(B1p ∧B2¬p).
Proposition 4.2 depends on the fact that we are considering belief and common
belief rather than knowledge and common knowledge, where knowledge is defined
in the usual way, as truth in all possible worlds:
(M,ω, i) in Kiϕ iff (M,ω′, i) in ϕ for all ω′ ∈ Πi(ω),
with Ki the knowledge operator for player i, and where we have assumed that
ω ∈ Πi(ω) for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Aumann’s result holds if we consider
common belief (as long as what we are agreeing about are judgments of proba-
bility and expectation). With knowledge, there are formulas that are valid with a
common interpretation that are not valid under innermost-scope semantics when
there is ambiguity.For example, Mc(Ψ)  Kiϕ ⇒ ϕ, while it is easy to construct
a structure M with ambiguity such that (M,ω, 1) in K2p ∧ ¬p. What is true
is that M(Ψ) in (K1ϕ ⇒ ϕ) ∨ . . . ∨ (Knϕ ⇒ ϕ). This is because we have
(M,ω, i) in Kiϕ ⇒ ϕ, so one of K1ϕ ⇒ ϕ, . . . , Knϕ ⇒ ϕ must hold. As
shown in [Halpern 2009], this axiom essentially characterizes knowledge if there
is ambiguity.
As noted above, the proof of Proposition 4.1 demonstrates that, given a struc-
tureM with ambiguity and a common prior, we can construct an equivalent common-
interpretation structure M ′ with heterogeneous priors, where M and M ′ are said to
be equivalent (under innermost scope) if for every formula ψ, M in ψ if and only
if M ′ in ψ. The converse does not hold, as the next example illustrates: when
formulas are interpreted using innermost scope, there is a common-interpretation
structure with heterogeneous priors that cannot be converted into an equivalent
structure with ambiguity that satisfies the CPA.
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Example 4.3 We construct a structure M with heterogeneous priors for which
there is no equivalent ambiguous structure that satisfies the CPA. The structure
M has three players, one primitive proposition p, and two states, ω1 and ω2. In ω1,
p is true according to all players; in ω2, the proposition is false. Player 1 knows
the state: his information partition is Π1 = {{ω1}, {ω2}}. The other players have
no information on the state, that is, Πi = {{ω1, ω2}} for i = 2, 3. Player 2 as-
signs probability 2
3
to ω1, and player 3 assigns probability 34 to ω1. Hence, M is a
common-interpretation structure with heterogeneous priors. We claim that there is
no equivalent structure M ′ that satisfies the CPA.
To see this, suppose that M ′ is an equivalent structure that satisfies the CPA,
with a common prior ν and a state space Ω′. As M ′ in pr 2(p) = 23 and M
′

in
pr 3(p) =
3
4
, we must have
ν({ω′ ∈ Ω′ : (M ′, ω′, 2) in p}) = 2
3
,
ν({ω′ ∈ Ω′ : (M ′, ω′, 3) in p}) = 3
4
.
Observe that M in B2(p⇔ B1p) ∧B3(p⇔ B1p). Thus, we must have M ′ in
B2(p ⇔ B1p) ∧ B3(p ⇔ B1p). Let E = {ω′ ∈ Ω′ : (M ′, ω′, 1) in B1p}. It
follows that we must have ν(E) = 2/3 and ν(E) = 3/4, a contradiction.
Example 4.3 demonstrates that there is no structure M ′ that is equivalent to the
structure M (defined in Example 4.3) that satisfies the CPA. In fact, as we show
now, an even stronger result holds: In any structure M ′ that is equivalent to M ,
whether it satisfies the CPA or not, players have a common interpretation.
Proposition 4.4 If a structure M ′ ∈ M(Ψ) is equivalent under innermost scope
to the structure M defined in Example 4.3, then M ′ ∈Mc.
Proof. Note that M  p⇔ (pr 1(p) = 1). Hence, if a structure M ′ is equivalent to
M , we must have that M ′ in p⇔ (pr 1(p) = 1), that is, for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N ,
(M ′, ω, i) in p⇔ (pr 1(p) = 1). By a similar argument, we obtain that for every
ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N , it must be the case that (M ′, ω, i) in ¬p ⇔ (pr 1(¬p) = 1).
Since the truth of a probability formula does not depend on the player under the
innermost-scope semantics, it follows that for each i, j ∈ N , the interpretations π′i
and π′j in M ′ coincide. In other words, M ′ is a common-interpretation structure.
5 Discussion
We have defined a logic for reasoning about ambiguity, and considered the tradeoff
between having a common prior (so that everyone starts out with the same belief)
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and having a common interpretation (so that everyone interprets all formulas the
same way). We showed that, in a precise sense, allowing different beliefs is more
general than allowing multiple interpretations. But we view that as a feature, not
a weakness, of considering ambiguity. Ambiguity can be viewed as a reason for
differences of beliefs; as such, it provides some structure to these differences.
We have not discussed axiomatizations of the logic. From Proposition 4.1 it
follows that for formulas in LCn (Ψ), we can get the same axiomatization with re-
spect to structures in M(Ψ) for both the out and in semantics; moreover, this
axiomatization is the same as that for the common-interpretation case. An ax-
iomatization for this case is already given in [Fagin and Halpern 1994]. Things
get more interesting if we consider Mcpa (Ψ), the structures that satisfy the CPA.
Halpern [2002] provides an axiom that says that it cannot be common knowledge
that players disagree in expectation, and shows that it can be used to obtain a sound
and complete characterization of common-interpretation structures with a common
prior. (The axiomatization is actually given for common knowledge rather than
common belief, but a similar result holds with common belief.) By Proposition 4.2,
the axiomatization remains sound for outermost-scope semantics if we assume the
CPA. However, using Example 4.3, we can show that this is no longer the case
for the innermost-scope semantics. The set of formulas valid for innermost-scope
semantics in the class of structures satisfying the CPA is strictly between the set of
formulas valid in all structures and the set of formulas valid for outermost-scope
semantics in the class of structures satisfying the CPA. Finding an elegant complete
axiomatization remains an open problem.
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